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I. Introduction
An Indian Chief was quoted in Calder v British Columbia as saying:
What we don't like about the government is their saying this: "We will give you this much land"
How can they give it when it is our own? We cannot understand it. They have never bought itfrom
us or our forefathers. They have never fought and conquered our people and taken the land in that
way, and yet they say now that they will give us so much land - our own land ... [Our] forefathers
for generations and generations past had their land here all around us; chiefs had had their hunting
grounds, their salmon streams, and places where they got their berries; it has always been so. J
This statement could have been made by any indigenous person from any part of the world, whether it be a
settler state in the Americas, Canada, Australia, New Zealand or a former British colony in Africa or Asia. It is echoed
by Orang Asli leaders in Peninsula Malaysia, and native chiefs in Sarawak or Sabah. It could have been made
yesterday, a decade or a century ago. In fact that statement was made in 1888 by one David Mackay of the Nishga'a
nation of British Columbia, while addressing the Royal Commission visiting the Nishga territory, at the time when the
land rights of the British colonies was being considered in the Privy Council;' the final Court of Appeal for Canada as
well as the British Colonies. It embodies the sentiment and the bewilderment of indigenous peoples the world over,
where they find that their rights and ownership to the ancestral land that they occupy is measured by a criterion other
than their own, and is often trivialised to extinction.
The customary rights to land and the value attached to it has long been a matter considered in the common law
courts. Against this backdrop, Lord Haldane cautioned against 'a tendency ... to render [customary] title conceptually
in terms which are appropriate only to systems which have grown up under English law' .3This underscored the need to
ascertain rights possessed by indigenous peoples through their own laws, customs and usages instead of merely
importing the preconceived notions of property rights under the common law." The paper compares the idea of property
from the indigenous and 'the western' perspective and looks at the nature of usufructuary right to show that
'proprietary' rights should not be seen from only one perspective, that is the western perspective. This entails an
understanding of ways of 'seeing' ,'knowing' and conceptualization that may be different from the systems that have
grown under common law. The paper focuses on Sarawak, the largest state in Malaysia which has a majority native
population and whose interests in land are largely held under native customary tenure, often referred to as usufruct.
'Usufructuary' right is often said to be a personal right of use - a nomenclature that disregards the possibility
of possession and ownership. Terms like 'licensee' and 'permit holder' that are associated with 'usufruct' have negative
consequences on the quantum of payable compensations. The paper juxtaposes the restrictive provisions of the Sarawak
Land Code 1958 against the actual system of native land use system and examines such land use in the light of
'property' and 'adequate compensation' under Art 13 of the Federal Constitution. It explains how a usufructuary
interest amounts to a full beneficial ownership which must be compensated in the event of extinguishment or
deprivation. Apart from market value, adequate compensation should take into account the communal elements and the
traditional livelihood of the community which gives it its unique value as property .
• Paper presented at the 4th ASLI Conference 2007, "Voices from Asia for a Just and Equitable World", Faculty of Law,
University oflndonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia, 24-25 May 2007. Ramy Bulan is an Associate Professor and Deputy Dean (Development
and ResearchlPostgraduate) at the Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. Some of the materials for this article is
derived from chapters 5 and 8 of the writer's PhD thesis 'Native Title in Sarawak, Malaysia: Kelabit Land Rights in Transition'
(2005) Faculty of Law, Australian National University.
I Quoted in Calder v British Columbia (AG) [1973] 3 SCR 313, 319.
2 St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen (1888) 14AC 46.
3 Amodu Tijani v Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 211, 399.
4 [1921] 2 AC 399, 404.
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equal footing with other proprietary interests: see Canadian Pacific Ltd v Paul [1988J 2 SCR 654
at 677.16
The usufructuary concept has been perpetuated by use of the term 'licensee' which implies no right of
ownership until a document of title has been issued. In line with that concept, the definition ofa proprietor in s 2 of the
Sarawak Land Code:
Includes the Government and any person entitled to an estate or interest in alienated land, whether
such estate or interest is protected by registration or not, but does not include any person holding
or deemed to hold land by licence from the Government. (emphasis added)
Under the Code until a document of title has been issued, occupation of state land is deemed unlawful
occupation." Native customary rights (NCR) may be created under s 5 through felling of virgin jungle and its
occupation, planting of trees, use of land for burial and shrines and for right of way but even where NCR has been
created, such lands are said to be held by licence from the government. Under ss 10(3) and (4), further creation of NCR
or occupation of Interior Area Land is subject to issuance of a permit to be obtained from the Superintendent of Lands."
Any native who, without a prior permit in writing from a Superintendent, occupies any Interior Area Land or fells or
attempts to fell virgin jungle upon such land or attempts to create customary rights upon such land shall be guilty of an
offence."
The statute reduced native rights to a mere right of use and advanced the presumption that they have no kind of
ownership or rights to land. They could enjoy the 'fruits of the land' by foraging, hunting, fishing and even by
cultivation of the land, but have no absolute or statutory right to the land. Such a provision would have in no small
measure been influenced by the general common law of colonial expansion and accorded with the thinking at the time
when 'colonists ... conceived of the aborigines ... as 'savages' and 'wild men' living in a state of nature [who] ... did not',
use the land in a progressive manner, and so had no claim.r" The fact was that Sarawak was already inhabited and
cultivated by groups who were not mere wanderers but were in occupation and were utilising the land according to their
own customary practices.
The classic case that is often quoted as an authority is the case Keteng bin Haji Li v Tua Kampong Suhaili
where Digby J said:
In Sarawak a person can be said to 'own' land only if there is a land office title subsisting in respect
of that land. If there is no such title the land is Crown land; the occupier is at best a mere licensee;
and he has no legal interest which he can either charge or transfer ... This is so whether for the
purposes of the Land (Classification) Ordinance the land is Native customary land; Reserved Land
or Interior area land. If a person abandons his legitimate occupation of such land, he does so at his
peri/' 31
The concept of a licence as envisaged by Digby J effectively denied the existence of a valid native perspective
of land ownership based on an elaborate system of rules and customs and is 'characteristic of the self-serving
ethnocentricity upon which colonialism is based' .32A licence is a right of user, not annexed to the land, which exists at
the pleasure of the legal owner. A licensee has no interest in land, and accordingly has no remedy against a third party
who disturbs him in the exercise of his licence." Permit or permission" implies that no proprietary rights existed. A
26 Ibid., 1093-95.
27 Sections 10 and 209.
28 Amended by Land Code (Amendment) Ordinance 1996, Cap A42. District Officer is replaced by Superintendent of Lands,
Department of Lands and Survey.
29 Penalty, in the case of a first offence, is a fine ofRM I000 and in the case of a second or subsequent offence, imprisonment
for two years and a fine ofRM5000.
30 Bain Attwood, 'Introduction: The Past as Future: Aborigine, Au tralia and the (Dis)Course of History' in B Attwood (ed),
The Age of Mabo (1996) viii-x.
31 (1951-54) CR 9.
32 Kent McNeil, 'A Que lion of Title: Has the Common Law Been Misapplied to Di posse s the Aboriginals' (1990) 16
Monash University Law Review 91-110, 92.
3l Clerk & l.indsell on Torts (14th edn) 773 para 1336. This was the approach taken in a case in the High Court in Sibu,
Sarawak between Juti ak Maga & Ors v Lien Ho Sawmill Bhd & 2 Ors (Unreported, Suit No. 21-44 of 2001). In a plea for
interlocutory injunction, on a strict application of s 5, the court held that the plaintiff was a licensee by law and therefore had no right
to bring an action for trespass.
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permit is revocable at any time or expires by lack of renewal. While a provision remains for the issuance of permits, in
practice, permits were rare and perhaps even non-existent. They were formally discontinued through a government
directive in 1964.35 These provisions not only restricted further creation of customary rights on land, but made native
occupiers 'illegal occupants' on their own land. Neither existing native social structures nor the traditional land use
practices are fully taken cognisance of, despite the fact that these are integral to the survival of those communities.
What is recognised is an occupational right which is restricted to specific methods and duration.
Soon after the passage of the Land Ordinance 1948, the predecessor of the Land Code, the inappropriate
adoption of the term licence was not totally unnoticed. Despite the ordinary meaning of the term 'licence', the effect
attributed by the courts to a licence point to a proprietary right in the land. In Sijip anak Majan v Regina" Lascelles J
commented that although the plaintiff's interest on land, was termed a licence, the plaintiffs were entitled to benefits
from the land, and that 'permission for others to use the land would be necessary'. He referred to the statement by the
state counsel Peter Mooney that as licensees they were 'entitled to benefits from the land' and 'permission for others to
use that land would be necessary. Lascelle J said
Mr Mooney submitted that even if the Rituh Dayaks were licensees they were entitled to the benefits
from the land and these benefits had been lessened. He pointed that there was no such estate which
can be created in English law which is on all fours with that of lawful occupier of jerame and that
we must look to our own land laws for guidance on this point. He suggested that a tenant at wil/,
entitled to embelments, was the nearest approach. He further submitted that the only definition of
property which could befollowed is the one given in the Sarawak Interpretation Ordinance.
His Honour then held
The Land (Classification) Ordinance admittedly makes the Rituh Dayaks licensee of the land but
there is no avoiding the fact that in this colony such an occupier has an interest which is an
exclusive one: to hold otherwise would create chaos throughout the vast areas of Sarawak which
are at this time held under customary tenure Section 92 of the Land Ordinance further lays down
that even when the government requires such land for a residential, mining or other reserve or for
public purpose formal notice to quit is necessary and such compensation shall be paid as is
reasonable. 1 am satisfied that there was 'property' within the meaning appearing in the
Interpretation Ordinance and that is the meaning which must apply in this case before me. The
persons who suffered the loss are clearly the people who held land by customary tenure. (emphasis
added}. 37
In the more recent case of Nor Nyawai v Borneo Plantations Sdn Bhd & Superintendent of Lands and Survey
& Anor3839 the High Court had occasion to consider the occupation of land by native Iban. This was a case of an
encroachment by the defendants, the Borneo Pulp Plantations into some land which the plaintiffIban claimed to be land
which they held according to their customary practices. The High Court held that the plaintiffs have occupied and
cultivated their temuda land under their personal laws and this fell under s 5(2)(a) and (c). In that case Ian Chin J further
recognised the existence of the Iban pemakai menoa (the area from which its members makai lit, 'eat') and pulau galau
(land reserved for communal use). Ian Chin J quoted from a paper by Tan Sri Datuk Gerunsin Lembat thus:
Pemakai menoa is an area of land held by a distinct longhouse or village community and includes
farms, gardens.fruit groves, cemetery, water andforest within a defined boundary (garis menoa).
The purpose (sic) of creating a pemakai menoa involves the ritual ceremony of panggu/ menoa.
After the ceremony has been performed, thefirst cutting of virgin jungle for settlement and farming
can commence. From then onwards, the community can establish its rights to the felled area,
34 Land Code s 10(5), (6), (7) sub-s 5 goes further to provide that the Superintendent's consent for the purpose of any permit
shall not be given if he considers that it would prejudice the individual or communal rights of other inhabitants. An aggrieved person
may appeal to the Director within 21 days with a further appeal by petition to the Minister within 30 days.
35 Zaidie K Zainie, 'Native Customary Land: Policies and Legislation' (paper presented at the Seminar on Native Customary
Land, Kuching, 29 September-3 October 1994). Also A 1N Richards wrote in 1961, 'J know of no permits issued under s 10 of the
Land Code or of any recently established rights denied under s 5'. See also Francis Johen Adam, 'Native Customary Land Rights in
arawak' (1998) 25 (special edn) Journal 0/Malaysian and Comparative Law 217.
36 Land Cases (1946-1968) 49.
37 Ibid., 49, 51.
38 [2001] 2 CLl 769.
39 [200 I] 2 LJ 769.
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boundaries (garis menoa) are drawn between the villages. These boundaries normally follow
streams watersheds, ridges and permanent landmarks.
Pemakai menoa includes cultivated land (tanah umai), old longhouse sites (tembawai) cemetery
(pendam) andforest area (pulau).
The Court of Appeal overturned the High Court decision on 9 July 2005,40 holding that there was insufficient
proof of occupation by the respondents (Iban) in the disputed area, although they had satisfied the test for NCR in the
adjacent area. Nonetheless, the decision of the Court of Appeal" notably did not disturb the High Court's finding that
the Iban concept of pemakai menoa exists. The court endorsed the expositions of the law by the learned judge at the
High Court, that that the common law respects the pre-existence of rights under native laws or customs and they do not
owe their existence to statutes. Legislation was only relevant to determine how much of those native customary rights
have been extinguished. The Sarawak Land Code does not abrogate whatever native customary rights that existed
before the passing of that legislation even though natives are no longer able to claim new territory without a permit
under section 10 of that legislation.
The High Court said that the plaintiffs did not hold documentary title to the land, but they had a licence to the
land. But Ian Chin J was clearly uncomfortable characterising the plaintiffs' status as that of mere licensees, as provided
in s 8(3) of the Land Ordinance and subsequently in s 5(2) ofSarawak Land Code 1958:
While it is correct that the plaintiffs do not hold any title to the land and may be termed licensees
but their license ... cannot be terminable at will. Theirs are native customary rights which can only
be extinguished in accordance with' the laws and this is after payment of compensation ... The
description of native customary rights as 'licences' is ill-fitting and this was clearly illustrated by
Richards, at p 18, in these words:
"... Neither will 'licence' or 'permission' do to describe land rights. Permission is revocable at any
time or expires by lack of renewal, and licence is 'a right of user not annexed 10 land'. Use of these
terms would almost imply that no rights existed at all. Occupation of land without document or
registration has been acquiesced in for so long, that title would appear to have been obtained by
prescription to a large part of 'the bundle of rights '..../2
A finding that NCR exists would clearly allow for an action to be brought against another for trespass on land,
indicating full control and possession. Such interest can only be extinguished in accordance with laws and this is after
payment of compensation'.
In contrast to the licence under s 5 of the Land Code, a grant in perpetuity can be given by the Director of
Lands and Survey to a native under s 18 in situations where a native has 'occupied and used' any area of unalienated
state land in accordance with rights acquired by customary tenure 'amounting to ownership of land' for residential or
agricultural purpose." It is unclear what the term 'amounting to ownership' means. It is suggested that this should
encompass long occupation and use of the land according to their customary practices, which grants full beneficial
ownership.
A new s 15 introduced in 200244 provides that no state land shall be alienated or used for public purposes until
all NCR has been surrendered or compensated. This is a tacit acknowledgment of the existence of NCR and for 'full
respect' to be given to NCR in Sarawak, the right must amount to a 'full beneficial ownership', which may be assessed
in economic terms and subject to full compensation upon any form of deprivation. This brings us to the question of
adequacy of compensation for deprivation and compulsory acquisition of land.
IV. 'Usufruct' as a Proprietary Right under Art 13 of the Federal Constitution
It clear from the above discussion that the usufructuary rights of the natives under their laws and custom is a
proprietary right that is protected by the Federal Constitution. It is not merely a personal right but an interest that
amounts to a full beneficial 0 nership which is a proprietary right. Despite the use of the term license, in both contexts,
the rights have economic value and fall under Art 13 of the Federal Constitution which means that any deprivation of
such right must be ubject to compensation.
40 'Borneo Pulp wins ppeal Case on NCR Land', The Sarawak Tribune, Saturday, 9 July 2005, 3
41 Superintendent of Lands and Survey. Bintulu v 'or Anak Nyawai and Ors and two other appeal' [2006] 6 MLJ 256.
42 lbid., 28-l.
4) Section 18 \\ as amended in 1963 following the report of the Land Committee in 1962 to allow for repla ement of
customary tenure by a le e for 99 years free of all char es. This was. however. amended in 1974 when the provi ion reverted to the
original provi 'Ion allowing for a grant m perpetuity of R land.
4~ Land Code (Amendment) Ordinance 2002.
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Article 13 of the Federal Constitution states:
(1) No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with law.
(2) No law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of property without adequate compensation.
'Property' in Art 13, is 'not used in a special sense. It means what people can own and buy and sell, give
security for debts, use, wear out, improve, give away, destroy, settle on trust, leave by will or succeed to on
intestacy. ,451t is something that has a value which, when compulsorily acquired or used, can be assessed in economic
terms. 46 For an interpretation of 'property' the court in Adong bin Kuwau v Kerajaan Negeri Johor" relied on the
Indian case of Rabindra Kumar v Forest Officer." That case dealt with the meaning 'property' under Indian
Constitution art 19(1), which is similar to Art 13 of the Federal Consitution. The term 'property' is explained thus:
[IJn the strict legal sense, the word property signifies valuable rights or interests protected by law
and this is the primary appropriate and broader signification of the term. In modern legal system,
property includes practically all valuable rights ... it can be enjoyed as property and recognized as
equitable interests as well as legal interests and extending to every species of valuable rights or
interests in either real or personal property or easements, franchises and incorporeal
hereditaments. The term comprises also all rights which are incidental to the use, enjoyment and
disposition of intangible things, the bare possession, with colour or right of anything of value, the
right to be protected in one's possession of a thing or in one's privilege belonging to him as a
member for the Commonwealth including the right to contest judicially any invasion of that which
one possesses or owns. The property may reasonably be construed to include obligation rights and
other intangible and physical things and thus the word 'property' means not only the thing but also
the rights in the physical and corporeal thing which are created and sanctioned by law. 49
Relying on the above case and the Federal Court case of Selangor Pilot Association v Government of
Malaysia" Mokhtar Sidin JCA (as he then was) gave a wide interpretation to proprietary rights and held that the
aboriginal rights under common law and statutory law are proprietary rights protected by art 13 of the Federal
Constitution. The view of the High Court was fully endorsed by the Court of Appeal.
The question of customary title as a proprietary right was also dealt with in Sagong Tasi v Kerajaan Negeri
Selangor where the rights of the Orang Asli were called usufructuary rights which they could not convey, lease or
transfer. Mohd Noor Ahmad J referred to Mabo No.2, and to the decision of Brennan J where he said
Whether or not land is owned by the individual members of a community, a community which
asserts and asserts effectively that none of its members has any right to occupy and use the land has
an interest in the land that must be proprietary in nature: there is no other proprietor. It would be
wrong. in my opinion, to point to the inalienability of land by the community and, by importing
definitions of 'property' which require an alienability under the municipal laws of our society. to
deny that the indigenous people owned their land. The ownership of land within a territory in the
exclusive occupation of a people must be vested in the people: land is susceptible of ownership, and
there are no other owners. 51
Brennan J went on to explain that although aboriginal title was a communal title, individuals within the
community could, by its laws and customs, possess proprietary individual rights over their respective parcels of land.
He said
Indeed it is not possible to admit traditional usufructuary rights without admitting a traditional
proprietary community title. There may be difficulties of proof of boundaries or of membership of
the community or of the representatives of the community which was in exclusive possession, but
those difficulties afford no reason for denying the existence of a proprietary community title capable
of recognition by the common law. That being so, there is no impediment to the recognition of
45 L A Sheridan, 'The Mysterious Case of the Disappearing Business: Government of Malaysia & Anor v Selangor Pilot
Association' (1977) 4(1) Journal of Malaysian and Comparative Law 2,3.
46 Andrew Harding, 'Property Rights under the Malaysian Constitution', in F A Trindade and H P Lee (eds), The Constitution
of Malaysia, Further Perspectives and Developments. Essays in Honour of Tun Mohamed Suffian (1986) 59-75, 66.
41 [1997] 1 MLJ 418.
41 AIR (1955) Manipur 49.
49 AIR (1955) Manipur 49, 53-54.
so [1975] 2 MLJ 66. uffian LP at 69 adopted the construction placed on the Indian .article by the In~ian Supreme Court on
the unamended art 31 where the language of art 13 approximates with the language of the Indian art 31 before Its amendment.
SI (1992) 175 CLR I.
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individual non proprietary rights that are derived from the community's laws, and customs and are
dependent on the community title. A fortiori, there can be no impediment to the recognition of
individual proprietary rights. $1
'In keeping with worldwide recognition now being given to aboriginal rights' and having considered the facts
before him, Mohd Nor Ahmad J concluded that the right of Orang Asli to land is a proprietary right 'in their customary
and ancestral lands'. This decision applies to the question of usufructuary right in Nor Nyawai. Having established that
the right is a proprietary right, the next important issue is its protection under the Constitution.
V. Protection of Property Against Deprivation and Acquisition Without Compensation
Under art 13(1) and (2), deprivation could only be done 'in accordance with the law' and no law shall provide
for 'compulsory acquisition' without adequate compensation. It is important to note briefly the impact of the two
clauses of the article which are to be read disjunctively. The term deprivation includes any loss of property as a result
of statute or executive act, which might, but does not necessarily, involve acquisition of property. Viscount Dilhome,
delivering the majority opinion in Selangor Pilot Association case, said
A person may be deprived of his property by another acquiring it or using it but those are not the
only ways by which he can be deprived. As a matter of drafting, it would be wrong to use the word
'deprived' in art 13(1) if it meant and only meant acquisition or use when those words are used in
53art 13(2). .
Article 13(1) renders unconstitutional a statute or executive act which deprives a person of property and which
is contrary to natural justice or due process of law. Article 13(2) renders unconstitutional a statute which provides for
compulsory acquisition or use of property but which does not also make adequate compensation. This is a check on the
legislature, not the executive. 54 In other words, clause (1) gives a right to natural justice or due process in the case of
deprivation, but clause (2) gives a right to adequate compensation in the case of compulsory acquisition or ,use;
deprivation may involve acquisition or use, in which case both rights come into play. 55A right to compensation must be
implied into any deprivation, and any deprivation of land under any legislation must be read subject to the Federal
Constitution. Adong bin Kuwau dealt with it thus:
The Federal Constitution art 13 supersedes both statutory law and common law and mandates that
all acquisition of proprietary rights shall be compensated and that any law made for the compulsory
acquisition or use of property without compensation shall be rendered void in accordance with art 4
of the Federal Constitution. 56
The Court of Appeal affirmed that decision saying that 'where state action has the effect of unfairly depriving
a citizen of his livelihood, adequate compensation is one method of remedying the harm occasioned by such action
pursuant to art 13 of the Federal Constituuon.v'i suggest that deprivation might encompass elements of dispossession,
withdrawal, extinguishment or termination of property. Compulsory acquisition, on the other hand, should be
interpreted broadly to include effective acquisition even when there is no actual transfer of title, but involves more than
mere deprivation. 58 Where the conditions of Art 13 are not satisfied, any deprivation or compulsory acquisition will be
unconstitutional. Harding puts it in this way
The statute must make provision for the assessment and payment of adequate compensation, in that
it must either fIX the compensation. or provide principles for the assessment of the compensation, at
a figure which bears a reasonable relation to the current market value of the property. Thus the
claimant will have no argument based on the Constitution merely on the grounds that the
compensation awarded is less than the market value of the property; he will be able to base his
argument on art 13(2) only if the statute makes no or inadequate provision for adequate
compensation.
52 Ibid.
~) elangor Pilot Association [1977) I MLJ 133, 135
54 Harding, above n 46, 72.
55 Ibid., 73.
se [1998) 2 MLJ 418, 434
57 Ibid., 158. 164.
58 Ibid.
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VI. What is Adequate Compensation?
The term 'adequate compensation' postulates a sum which is ajust reimbursement for the loss of the land and
is a sum equivalent to 'full compensation' .59 What factors should properly be taken into account when assessing
'adequate compensation' under art 13(2)? Harding suggests that 'adequate' means 'corresponding to the current market
value of the property acquired' or, in the case of use, 'corresponding to the current market rental of the property used
(or the equivalent), for the relevant period'. He noted, however, the difficulty of assessment and market value of land,
as even experts in valuation may reach radically different valuations. Be that as it may, the courts have said that the
principles in respect of compensation awarded under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 would apply to award of
compensation under the Land Code'"
What is the meaning of market value in the context of the Land Code? In Ahmat bin Gani & 11 Ors v
Superintendent of Lands & Surveys, First Division" land owners were dissatisfied and objected to awards by the
Superintendent upon acquisition of certain lands situated in Native Area Lands." Since the code does not define market
value the court referred to an Indian authority" and held that
The market value of land may be roughly described as the price that an owner willing, and not
obliged to sell, might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser of the land.
The fair market value of the lands is to be determined by 'evidence of sales of the same land or similar land in
the neighbourhood, after making due allowance for all the circumstances'. 64 The potentialities must be taken into
consideration, which means 'future utility' or 'the probable use of the land in a mere lucrative manner' or also called
'special adaptability' of the land."
Payment of compensation applies not only in respect of acquisition of land but also extinguishment. In the
context ofSarawak, apart from 'acquisition', the terms 'resumption" and 'extinguishment' are used.
VII. Acquisition and Extinguishment and Compensation
Through the Land Code (Amendment) Ordinance 2000, the term 'termination' replaced 'extinguishment'."
The change in terminology from extinguishment to termination was primarily done to avoid misunderstanding of the
effect of the terms when translated into Malay, the official language. Extinguishment, which is translated as
dimansuhkan, connotes complete abolishment ofthe right, whereas termination is translated ditamatkan, which implies
a cutting back of an existing right.68What is important is that there is a 'clear and plain intention' to extinguish. This test
that applied in Mabo (No.2), and in Wik, was used in Nor Nyawai.
59 Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (4th edn, 1971).
60 Ahmat bin Gani & J 1 Others v Superintendent a/Lands and Survey, First Division (FC), Land Cases (1969-1987) 20-30,
25.
61 ibid.
62 Land Code 1958 s 48.
63 The court referred to Nanyang Manufacturing Co v The Collector of Land Revenue, Johore [1954] MLJ 69, 71 where
Buhagiar J adopted the definition of Jenkins J in Kailas Chandras v Secretary of State (1913) 17 Cal LJ 35.
04 Buhagiar J in Kailas Chandras v Secretary of State (1913) 17 Cal LJ 35. This was quoted by Suffian J (as he then was) in
delivering the leading judgment of the Federal Court in the case of Superintendent of Lands and Survey v Aik Hoe & Co Ltd [1966] 1
MLJ 243, 247.
65 Per George Seah J in Ahmat bin Gani & 11 Ors v Superintendent of Land and Survey, First Division, Land Cases (1969-
1987) 9. The court referred to the Privy Council case of Vyricheria Narayan Gajapatirju v The Revenue Divisional Officer,
J'izagapatam (1930) AC 302, 313, where Lord Romer said:
... it has been established by numerous authorities that the land is not to be valued merely by reference to the use to
which it is being put at a time which its value is to be determined ... but also by reference to the users to which it is
reasonably capable of being put in the future. No authority indeed is ~quired for the ~ropos!tion. I~ is a self evident
one. No one can suppose in the case of land, which is certain or even likely, to be used 10 the immediate or reasonably
near future for the building purposes, that the owner, howeve.r ~i11ing .a ve~dor, will be co~t~nt to sell the land for its
value as waste lands or that, in ascertaining its value the POSSIbIlity of Its being used for building purposes would have
to be taken into account.
66 Resumption under Part IV includes surrender of land and declaration of lands for public purposes.
07 Part IV is titled 'resumption of land' and the words 'extinguishment' and 'extinguished' wherever they appear is
substituted with 'termination' and 'terminated' respectively. See also Land Code 5S 4,15, 33A, 94 and 141.
b8 Per onal communication with an officer of the Sarawak Lands and Survey Department, Kuching, June 2002.
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Whilst the Land Code has always provided for compensation to be awarded in the event of acquisition or
extinguishment of land, until the amendment in 1998, the question of how and on what principles compensation was to
be determined was left to the discretion of the settlement officer."
The first case that dealt with extinguishment on NCR was Ansi Rengan v Hoe Hung Sawmill Ltd 70Damages of
RM500 were awarded to the plaintiff based on 'the return which the plaintiff might be likely to get from the land if he
had exercised his right to cultivate it'. 71 Pike CJ noted that he could not alienate or subdivide the land, nor could he
build upon it nor raise a mortgage on it, and on 'a shifting cultivation basis the plaintiff could not have farmed the land
more than once'.
In The Minister for Land and Mineral Resources v Bilam anak Chandail? when George Seah J had to deal
with compensation paid upon the extinguishment of NCR land, he noted that the Land Code did not provide what
manner and on what principles compensation was to be assessed upon extinguishments under the direction of the
Minister." Thus, it was submitted for the Minster that the only rights that entitled Bilam to compensation was his loss of
'land', viz one acre, and loss of cultivation thereon. And for the native respondent, it was contended that as a result of
the requisition, he had lost his ancestral land which he had inherited and which, by custom, he could not alienate but
must hand down to his heirs. He and his descendants might dwell, build and develop the land. The arbitrator gave to the
respondent compensation for potential use of land in the future. The question was whether it legitimate to take the
potential use of the land for purposes other than agriculture?
On appeal, George Seah J considered the basis of valuation adopted by the Superintendent of Lands and
Survey and the Settlement Officer and held that compensation must be for the extinguishment of NCR with value to be
given for the loss of the' land', fruit trees, crops or building lawfully erected on it. Reasonable removal expenses ought
to be included in appropriate cases. In determining the value of the 'land', the bonafide selling prices of neighbouring
property held under title and subject to the same condition and use could be taken into account but the potential use of
the requisitioned 'land' is irrelevant."
The learned judge was careful to state that this was merely obiter, and not stated as a rule that applies to every
situation. He warned that each case must be considered on its own facts.
In another case of Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor v Kajing Tubek & Ors,75 a representative
action was brought by some natives from the area affected by the building of the Bakun hydro-electric dam. The court
noted that some compensation had been paid to the plaintiffs for the loss of their NCR, but noted that the
extinguishment was in accordance with the provisions of existing written law. Gopal Sri Ram JCA noted that the
deprivation of the 'livelihood and cultural heritage' of the natives 'certainly comes within the scope of the expression of
'life' in art 5(1) of the Federal Constitution. The learned judge quoted the Indian authority where the court said 'where
there is deprivation of livelihood or one's way of life, that is to say, one's culture, there is deprivation of life
itself .7~he native Kayan, in that case had brought an action questioning the validity of the law on Environmental
69 Sections 30(A) and (B) of the Order VlII of 1920, for instance, provided that whenever the government 'resumes
possession of any occupied land for any purpose' claims for compensation are to be made to the Superintendent. The basis of
valuation 'for all country lands shall be the original costs, plus a reasonable amount to compensate for actual expenditure, and
interest on money spent on improving land'.
70Kuching High Court Civil Suit No. K 4 of 1965 dated 2 May 1968 (unreported). See Land Cases (1946-1968) Land and
Survey Department, Sarawak, 220.
71 Ibid., 226.
72 Land Cases (1969-1987), lands and Survey Department, Sarawak, Kuching High Court (Civil Application No.2 of 1971).
73 This was done under s 82(2), which has since been deleted. George Seah J noted also that, although express provisions
were made for the payment of monetary compensation to a native whose customary rights have been extinguished, there was
unfortunately no provision as to the manner or basis on which compensation was to be determined either by a ettlement officer
under the Land Settlement Ordinance or by the Superintendent of Lands and Survey under the Land Ordinance.
74 Land Cases (1969-1987) at 720.
7~ [1997] 4 CLJ 254. The deprivation of interests as outlined in A dong 's case wa not pleaded in this case . This writer
questioned the basis for giving monetary value to 'deprivation of life'. Elsewhere, Ramy Bulan, 'Native Title as a Proprietary Right:
A Step in the Right Direction?' (2001) Asia Pacific Law Review emphasi ed that the survival of an indigenou community depends
on the land, and cannot really be quantified in monetary terms becau e the removal and dispo e ion from their land constitutes the
deprivation of lite. the judge in Adong said (1998) MLJ 418.435.
' ... an aborigin~ will not be in the same category as the other Malay ian citizen, for an ab riginal ha a special
attachment to hi . land and Without any kill. education or way to live as the other communities. he would find it very
difficult if not impossible to relocate him elf and tart afresh.'
C~nver ion of ~he rights into monetary terms could mean that the rights are easily converted into money, and compensation
may b~ paid on the bas.ls that ~he group ca.n 'r~gene.rate' the money. The harsh reality is that the monetary benefit may not last. Since
their lives are 0 entwine? With land, which IS their basic 'economic' and 'survival' base, once removed from it, their cultural base
would al 0 b destroyed. Ihe article .hould, be een as work in progres . While on the one hand it annot be properly 'sub tituted',
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Impact Assessment. It was held that the respondents did not have 'substantive locus standi' and there was no
consideration by the courts of the adequacy of compensation for deprivation of livelihood. 77
In 1998, an amendment to the Land Code set out rules for the assessment of compensation payable for the
extinguishment of native customary rights but these were deleted in 200078 when a new s 5(4) provided for termination
and resumption of land by the state. The said amendments made major changes in relation to extinguishment of rights
and payments of compensation. Among the objectives of the amendment were the harmonisation of the process and
procedure for the resumption of land under native customary rights with that of other with that of alienated land and
harmonisation of the process of adjudicating the amount of compensation to be paid.
The use of 'termination' and 'extinguishment' reinforces the idea of the land as being 'state land' but at the
same time, provision for compensation reinforces the proprietary nature of the rights and interests in the land. Now that
the principle upon which compensation is paid is now harmonised, addressing the uncertainty that has long clouded the
position or compensation of NCR. Section 60 enumerates the matters to be taken into consideration in determining
compensation of resumed land. In summary, these are:
• the market value of the land at the date of notification of resumption;"
• increase in value of the other land of the interested person, which results from the
resumption;
• damage suffered or sustained' as a result of the severance of the land, whether to
his other property or to his actual earnings;
.0 reasonable expenses incidental to change of residence or business premises which
were 'compelled' by the resumption;
• improvement to the land made with prior consent of the Superintendent after the
notice is posted; and
• in particular, for NCL and kampung reserves, payment to be made for cost of
resettlement or relocation which the government had agreed to.
The courts are to disregard the urgency of the resumption, the increase in the value of the land resumed which
is likely to accrue from its use after resumption" or evidence of sales of comparative properties unless the sales are
bonafide and not for speculative purposes."
The significance of these provisions is that lands under native title are given a clear proprietary component by
statutory law. For compensation purposes, there appears to be no distinction made between 'extinguishment' and
'termination' or 'surrender' provided a person is able to satisfy the onus of proof of interest under s 83. Interest in land
being resumed under s 83 includes both registered and unregistered interest under s 132 as well as rights lawfully
created under ss 5, 6 or 7.82 These provisions bring the Land Code in line with art 13. Compensation payments are
recognition of 'value' to the property that can be assessed in economic terms.
As procedure for adjudication of land has been harmonised, and market value of land is a determining factor in
payable compensation, since most of the lands under customary tenure are in the interior, the impact of that is that they
the pragmatic approach to deprivation or acquisition of their lands is to adequately compensate them when acquisition or deprivation
occurs. One of the ways to decide on adequacy of compensation is to look at the proprietary value of the interest.
76 AIR 1965 SC, 190. That case considered 'adequate compensation' under art 31, which is similar to art 13 of the Federal
Constitution.
77 The argument on right to 'life' has not been further developed.
78 The Land Code (Amendment) Ordinance 2000 (Cap A 78) is yet to take effect.
79 Under s 60 to determine the market value:
a) improvement made within two years prior to resumption is to be disregarded unless it can be proved to be made in
good faith and not in contemplation of proceedings for resumption '.
b) the value is not to exceed the price which a bonafide purchaser might reasonably be expected to pay for the land on
the basis of its existing u e or in anticipation of the continued use ofland
c) having regard to the category of land no account taken of 'any potential value for the land for any other higher or
more intensive use'.
BO Also, any enhancement or likely enhancement in value of land as a result of development in the neighbourhood by
provision of roads and other amenities,
BI See s 61 (a}-(j) for matter to be disregarded in determining compensation. Note, also, the rules as to the amount of
compensation payable under s 62.
82 A person shall not be deemed to be interested in any land being resum~dor occupied unless he has.an interest.under s 132.
Thi ection provides for regi tered intere t with indefeasibility of ntle, although It IS~10tregistered or h~ ~ interest ~eglsteredunder
Part VI. The definition includes rights or equity which a person may have against a person receivmg or entitled to receive
compen arion.
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still get minimal compensation compared to the quantum that is given for other types of land. In Ahmat bin Gani,
83
for
instance where it was argued that assessment for compensation for NCR should be on the same measure as that of
Mixed Zone lands on grounds that they were subject to compulsory acquisition by the government for the same purpose
at the same time the topography of the lands in the Native Reserve were the same as that of the Mixed Zone. George
Seah J at the High Court had this to say:
It is common knowledge that the lands within the mixed zone area in Sarawak can fetch a much
higher price than lands situated in the native reserves and held under native land title. Because of
this major difference, there could ...be no similarity. Without similarity there could be no
comparison.
VIII. Concluding Remarks
The Land Code is a contradiction in terms. While insisting that an NCR holder is a licensee and, by definition,
not a proprietor of land, it is clear that the code recognises that NCL do have an 'economic component'. The procedures
that have recently been legislated within the code for the payment of compensation in the event of resumption,
surrender or termination of NCR, with specific guidelines to arrive at compensation, has brought the code in line with
the Federal Constitution."
This paper has clearly shown that a 'usufruct' in land is a beneficial right akin to ownership and is a
proprietary right, even if does not accord with the nature of property under English law. This falls within the purview of
Art 13 and any deprivation of right or interest under native title must only be done 'in accordance with law'.
Extinguishments or termination of rights must be a 'clear and unambiguous' intention to terminate the rights, and such
termination must be adequately compensated. -
There is still an inherent problem, as Ahmat's case revealed. Lands held by natives do not fetch the same
market price as Mixed Zone lands because of the location - in the interior - where infrastructure, access and
communication networks are limited. Lack of security of tenure and its inalienability except to other natives also keeps
the market value low. As it is most native peoples are reluctant to part with their lands which they regard as ancestral
'heirlooms'. But the disinclination to part with the land resumed is irrelevant in consideration of compensation. One of
the fairest way to compensate native peoples is to replace the lands that are acquired with similar lands elsewhere,
where they can carry on the same customary practices. Given the fact that the Superintendent has no power to
compensate landowners with sufficient money to enable them to buy similar land elsewhere, this would be a fair option.
Perhaps another possible way to redress this is to take into account the fact that their lives are so intertwined with the
land which results in and perpetuates their vulnerability. Any removal of the land base is a removal of their cultural base
and directly their survival as a community. Along with other factors, this should be given due weight and consideration.
This way, indigenous conceptions of rights to land can be given full respect to achieve a just and equitable value to their
traditional lands.
13 Land Cases (1969-1987) 20-30, 25.
84 Any legislation that provided for the acqui ition of property without making provi ion for compensation would be
unlawful as again 1 the Federal Constitution. The amendment were made In 2000, but have yet to be gazetted and enforced.

